I find Emile Durkheim's objection to Social Contract Theory very interesting.

Social Contract Theory argues that the origins of Society are when pre-societal man ( in a state of nature ) coalesced and agreed to give up some ( or all ) rights and freedoms to an authority in exchange for the benefits and protections created by that society.

Now I already agree with Popper that anthropological and historical evidence demonstrate that society exists before the ability of humans to enter compacts. But, setting that aside....

Durkheim notes that this is a functionalist argument. It speaks to the benefits conferred by society. And as such it cannot account ( as it attempts to ) for the origin of a thing in the results of a thing. A functionalist argument is a good one for keeping something around that is useful. But you cannot know whether it will be useful before you have any experience of it.

Think of plucking a fruit off a plant without any experience. Perhaps it is sweet? Perhaps it is bitter? Perhaps it is poisonous? You cannot argue that its taste is a reason to find out what it tastes like. This defies the order of cause and effect.

This then tells me that Social Contract Theory is not about causes, but is about ends. It is a rationalization for accepting the present state of things; not an argument about how we ended up where we are. Very much like the Hegelian Dialectic, it claims to be an argument about a human mechanism, but is merely a description in hindsight; and a pretty poor one at that.

Further, by looking to the ends to rationalize the origins it echoes Utopian notions of social planning that confuse the advertisement with the product.

Humans are messy creatures. Many things don't go as planned, or have unintended consequences ( think Prohibition.) OTOH many beneficial things arose accidentally and were NOT a part of the plan ( think, the Internet. )

Both Social Contract Theory and Utilitarianism appeal to Utopians who would like to be able to order society without those messy random humans getting in the way. And in validating the removal of freedom from dissenters, they ask too high a price for guarantees they cannot make.

When one recognizes that legitimacy is vested in the individual, not in society or a "greater" portion thereof; then one can realize that messy humans who often want different things and evaluate plans differently can coexist. There is no need to bully minorities in order to try to create a false consensus. There is no need for a consensus that cannot be obtained voluntarily. And ultimately, the only person who can be harmed in such a way as to merit restrictions is another person; not an abstract society or institution.

Society predates humans. Just as with our ancestors it originates as a protection scheme that must've afforded real evolutionary benefits to apes; even while punishing sub-alpha males.

Humans have evolved the capacity to both protect themselves better from predators and to do greater damage to each other. Our capacity to think abstractly can both allow us to think of others around the globe as individuals like us, or identify with arbitrary abstractions such as flags and boundaries on a map.

We must evaluate for ourselves which systems of belief are better suited to our survival and which encourage our capacity for destruction.

I'm afraid that when I evaluate the greatest sources of human suffering I don't see individuals within a "state of nature," but political authority acting on "behalf" of society. It is authority and society that gave us WWI ( and consequently the Spanish Flu pandemic. ) It is dissenting individuals who gave us the Christmas Truce.

The power for peace lies in the individual and in eschewing coercion for voluntarianism.

Dante