¹ The Petition alleging M.B. a CHINs states causes (a), (b), and (c), on its face, and is unclear as to whether it incorporates (d) or (e). The complaint incorporates as “further information” the Preliminary Inquiry and Affidavit in § 5 (C), Plaint.Evid. 26, P.2. That affidavit, in its conclusory paragraph, states (d) and (e) as creating conditions wherein M.B. would be “subjected to an endangering environment if left in the care of [plaintiff]”, Plaint.Evid. 28, P.5.

² Plaintiff is brought to trial, in the pendant state proceeding, under IC 31-34-1-1, which provides actionable causes deriving from “inability, refusal, or neglect” to supply the child with “necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision”.

³ It is not included in the State’s statutory provisions providing criminal convictions which do provide such cause (IC 31-34-1-3). It is not included in the State’s statutory provisions requiring registry on the State’s sex offender registry (“SOR”) (IC 5-2-12-4) or Indiana’s Administrative Code (“IAC”), for example 465 IAC’s requirements for child care providers.

⁴ Possession of child pornography, as an obscenity statute, is a violation of the decency standards of the community, not an offense against a child.

⁵ Terminology is problematic in the case at Bar. The word “pedophile” is used in two very different and distinct senses in the forum of public discourse, including national media, from which the pendant State proceeding derived (i.e., Rick Robert’s “Forum of Public Opinion” , in which plaintiff granted an interview), and the forum of social science theory and research constraining the legal consideration of that interview and present at Bar.

⁶ The State’s complaint, supra, “§ I(A)(b)”, based on plaintiff’s prior conviction of obscenity, could be construed as complaint about plaintiff’s parental fitness based on “sexual orientation”, as the conviction is of such a nature as to identify that “orientation”, but the construction is not direct.

⁷ Count 72 of plaintiff’s complaint is restricted to challenging the policy of the State with respect to members of the putative class. The State’s counterclaim extends to “minor-attracted” individuals in its jurisdiction who are not custodians or guardians of minors, by virtue of entry in the State’s “child abuse registry”, or “minor-attracted” individuals of the various states who engage in political activity reaching the State of Indiana, on similar grounds, and that record entry is propagated to the various states with full faith and credit to Indiana’s finding by Interstate Compact.

⁸ The instant case is analogous to Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), with respect to the possible intent of the State to be forthcoming with their true complaint should plaintiff prevail on appeal in the pendant state proceeding, “In short, we viewed Dombrowski to be a case presenting a situation of the ‘impropriety of [state officials] invoking the statute in bad faith to impose continuing harassment in order to discourage appellants’ activities . . . ‘“.

⁹ The “information on his computer that could possibly clear his name” was billeting information for advance ticket sales in Indianapolis and New York City, and the early ticket sales were primarily to minor-attracted individuals and their families. The MCOFC expressed opposition to the production in interview with the plaintiff, Plaintiff’s Evid. 70.

¹⁰ e.g. “The underlying rationale for the federal child pornography laws…..[w]hen an obscenity statute is challenged as unconstitutional….the Supreme Court balances the government’s interest in protecting the sensibilities of unwilling recipients from exposure to pornography against the dangers of government censorship”, United States v. Knox, No. 92-7089, (3rd Circ. 1994).

¹¹ The impact to the injured party in Elrod, deriving from deprivation of political association by virtue of patronage, is similar to the impact on plaintiff and the putative class by the State’s actions.

¹² Plaint.Evid.Bk.2, 3, quoting Judge Moores testimony to the Indianapolis City-County Council seeking a budget increase.

¹³ “When it shall appear to….any United States District Court sitting in Indiana that there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or propositions of the laws of [Indiana], which are determinative of the said cause, and there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Court of [Indiana], such federal court may certify such questions or propositions of the laws of [Indiana] to the Supreme Court of [Indiana].”

¹⁴ Defendants secured plaintiff’s entry in the State of Indiana’s “child abuse registry” by perjury. If plaintiff should remarry, and have additional children, they would be subject to seizure at birth, and plaintiff would have no defense. Plaintiff has no right to removal from the registry at law. This has never been an issue in Marion County, because no one has ever successfully defended themselves before the MCJC on dependency complaint (Amended Complaint 559).

¹⁵ Plaintiff has asserted that the MCOFC “service recommendations” proposed in the pendant State proceeding constitute a status of servitude to the State (Amended Complaint 1568).

¹⁶ More broadly, those occupations listed in I.C. 31-32-11 (2), (3), and in excess of simple duty to report abuse or neglect.

¹⁷ Plaintiff’s correspondence to defendant’s counsel, dated November 11, 2005, and referred to in defendant’s motion opposing a rule 55(a) and (c) order, read “I would not object to an enlargement….for the governmental defendants (excepting the MCOFC Supervisor and Caseworker in individual capacity)”